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Abstract: This paper demonstrates that unintended effects of climate policies (Green
Paradox effects) also arise in general equilibrium when countries compete for mobile
factors of production (capital and resources/energy). Second, it shows that countries
have a rationale to use strictly positive source-based capital taxes to slow down resource
extraction. Notably, this result comes about in the absence of any revenue requirements
by the government, and independently of the elasticity of substitution between capital
and resources in production. Third, the paper generalizes the results obtained by Eich-
ner and Runkel (2012) by showing that the Nash equilibrium entails inefficiently high
pollution.
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1 Introduction
Climate policies which curb the demand for fossil resources like coal, oil and natural gas
have been met with skepticism in the last couple of years. For one thing, they have not
been successful in reducing emissions from the burning of fossil fuels significantly, and for
another thing, they have been shown to have an unintended effect. In particular, rapidly
rising carbon taxes over time may incentivize resource owners to extract more quickly
and thereby accelerate climate change. The intuition is that resource owners anticipate
that rising future carbon taxes will lower market prices and decrease future resource
rents. Therefore, they will extract more resources in the present. This effect has become
known as the “Green Paradox” (Sinn, 2008). As a remedy to this unintended effect,
Sinn proposes a supply-side policy that is aimed at lowering the returns to resource
owners’ investment, namely a withholding tax imposed on resource owners’ capital gains
that lowers the net return on their financial investments and thus makes extraction less
attractive.
This early analysis by Sinn neglects two important features that are relevant for climate
policy. First, the interest rate at which resource owners can invest their income from
extraction is not exogenously given. It is influenced by extraction itself because a change
in extraction will lead to a change in capital supply and thus a change in the interest
rate. This issue has recently been addressed by Eichner and Pethig (2011) and van der
Meijden et al. (2015). The latter authors find that the Green Paradox is likely to happen
also in a general equilibrium setting. Second, both capital and resources are mobile
factors of production and chase the highest returns internationally. This mechanism
provides incentives to governments to influence the allocation of capital and resources
in their favor. These strategic considerations by governments are reflected in the design
of national tax systems. Evidence of tax competition of this kind are declining statutory
corporate income tax (CIT) rates. For example, the average CIT rate in EU countries
fell from 35.5% to 24.2% between 1997 and 2007 (KPMG, 2007). Similar trends are
observed in resource-rich countries in Sub-Saharan Africa where average rates dropped
from 40% in 1980 to 35.4% in 2005 (Keen and Mansour, 2008).
The contribution of this paper is threefold. First, I show that Green Paradox effects also
arise in general equilibrium under reasonable assumptions in a world in which countries
compete for mobile capital and mobile resources. Second and more importantly, I argue
that in such a second-best world, there is indeed a rationale for non-cooperative but
welfare-maximizing governments to complement their tax portfolios with policies similar
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to Sinn’s proposed withholding tax on resource owners’ capital gains. More specifically,
governments have an incentive to tax capital investment at a strictly positive rate and are
indeed better off under a regime where capital and resource taxes are employed compared
to a regime with only resource taxes at their disposal.1 Third, employing a positive tax
on capital investment as an additional instrument does not lead to efficiency. Rather it is
shown that decentralized policy-making brings about inefficiently high pollution due to
inefficiently high resource extraction in the present. In this regard, the paper generalizes
the results obtained by Eichner and Runkel (2012) who show in a two-period model
that the efficiency result of Ogawa and Wildasin (2009) does not hold with endogenous
capital supply and emissions.
The intuition why governments find it beneficial to employ strictly positive capital taxes
in their tax portfolio is that capital and resources are complementary production factors
and a future source-based tax on capital in addition to carbon taxes lowers the interest
rate (just like Sinn’s proposed capital income tax on resource owners’ financial assets)
through general equilibrium effects and thereby slows down resource extraction. This
channel which I will refer to as “capital-tax-interest-rate” channel is stronger the higher
is the elasticity of substitution between capital and resources in production. The reason
is that with a higher elasticity, an additional capital tax in the future induces a stronger
substitution out of capital into resource use in the future, provoking a sharper decline
of the interest rate. This fall in the interest rate stimulates future resource demand in
all other countries by inducing a fall in the resource price through the Hotelling rule
and by making capital use by firms more attractive. Higher investment also increases
resource demand due to the assumed complementarity between capital and resources.
As a consequence, current resource extraction falls. Remarkably, the open-loop Nash
equilibrium when resource taxes and a capital tax are available to governments entails
a strictly positive future capital tax in the absence of any revenue requirements by the
government and independently of the elasticity of substitution.
This paper models the interaction of global capital and resource markets and the strategic
interaction between jurisdictions (or countries) in attracting mobile factors of production
in the presence of an environmental externality that is associated with resource use. I
consider jurisdictions which non-cooperatively maximize their residents’ lifetime utility
by choosing from a set of environmental taxes on resource (energy) use and a source-
1 While the capital tax in my model is also source-based, it taxes capital investment directly, i.e., on the
side of production firms, not on the capital income side of the investing party. In this sense, this tax
on capital investment can be considered a demand-side policy. I focus on demand-side policies here
because they still seem to rank higher on the political agenda than supply-side policies.
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based tax on capital investment. Competitive markets allocate capital and resources
across countries and across periods. Resources are assumed to be in finite supply and
can be extracted in the first or second period. Governments are interested in the speed
of extraction and do not care about fiscal revenues. Particular emphasis in the analysis is
devoted to the role that factor mobility and the elasticity of substitution between capital
and resources play with respect to the efficiency of decentralized policy-making.
To focus on strategic interactions, I stick with the common approach in the tax compe-
tition literature in assuming symmetry between jurisdictions and examining symmetric
equilibria (e.g. Zodrow and Mieszkowski, 1986). As pointed out by Schwerhoff and Eden-
hofer (2013), symmetry eliminates some potentially beneficial effects of capital mobility,
in particular any gains from capital trade (and resource trade like in this paper). Fur-
thermore, there exist huge differences in the endowment with fossil oil and gas across
countries. These differences are, however, less pronounced for coal. Therefore, symmetry
may be a good starting point for analyzing strategic behavior by welfare-maximizing
governments.
I find that unilateral increases in resource or capital taxes cause intratemporal leakage
of resource use and thus emissions but also intertemporal leakage. For a positive capital
supply elasticity, rising future resource taxes induce higher resource extraction in the
present, confirming the Green Paradox result obtained in partial equilibrium. By con-
trast, rising future capital taxes may either speed up or slow down extraction, depending
on the degree of complementarity between capital and resources. For example, if capital
and resources can be easily substituted, a marginal increase in the future capital tax leads
to a reallocation of production inputs towards the resource in the future and thus de-
creases resource use in the present. In the absence of resource taxes in the governments’
tax portfolio, governments would therefore either tax or subsidize capital investment
under commitment. Surprisingly, this ambiguity goes away whenver governments have
both capital and resource taxes at their disposal. In that case, strictly positive capital
taxes prevail in equilibrium while resource taxes fall over time.
The open-loop Nash equilibrium is found to entail inefficiently high resource use in
the present. In addition to the usual free-riding incentives by governments due to the
environmental externality, private income externalities arise because capital tax and
resource tax bases abroad are affected. These externalities unambiguously aggravate the
transfrontier pollution problem.
Although the open-loop Nash equilibrium is time-inconsistent because governments would
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wish to deviate from their announced policies once the second period arrives, it would
be very easy to mimic a positive capital tax in the second period by subsidizing savings
in the first period. This policy would also bring the interest rate in the second period
down and thus decelerate resource extraction.
2 Related literature
This paper bridges the gap between two literatures: the resource economics literature,
which analyzes the intertemporal allocation of non-renewable resources, and the liter-
ature on tax competition, which is concerned with the static allocation of production
factors and the efficiency of decentralized policy-making in the presence of interjurisdic-
tional spillovers.
It adds to the latter literature, which originates in Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986) and
Wilson (1986), by introducing a finite stock of resources and allowing for different degrees
of complementarity between capital and resources in a general equilibrium framework.
One of the first contributions to this strand of literature in the context of environmental
policy is Oates and Schwab (1988) who find efficiency of decentralized policy-making
if there are no pollution spillovers across jurisdictions and first-best tax instruments
are available. Ogawa and Wildasin (2009) confirm this result for the case when capital
(which is assumed in fixed supply) and emissions are perfect complements and pollution
is transboundary. However, in their model, any tax rate is efficient and thus is the tax
rate in the Nash equilibrium. Eichner and Runkel (2012) endogenize capital supply and
thus emissions in the same framework and conclude that the Nash equilibrium brings
about inefficiently low capital taxes. While the focus of the latter paper is on the role
of the capital supply elasticity, this paper is concerned with the role of the elasticity
of substitution between capital and resources in production. Withagen and Halsema
(2013) also employ a tax competition framework but reverse the conventional timing
of decisions such that households anticipate government policies when deciding about
savings. They find a potential race to the top in environmental regulation. Rauscher
employs similar but static models of interjurisdictional factor mobility. In the case of
environmental externalities on utility, capital mobility is found to aggravate transfrontier
pollution problems (Rauscher, 1991, 2000, 2005), implying inefficiently lax environmental
regulation. By contrast, environmental regulation may be inefficiently strict if emission
externalities affect capital productivity (Rauscher, 1997a, 1997b). The whole literature
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on tax competition has largely ignored intertemporal considerations like in this paper,
with a recent exception being Klein and Makris (2014).
The present paper also contributes to the resource economics literature which has mostly
focused on single-country models (which can be interpreted as representing the world
economy) or comparative static exercises in multi-country models, largely neglecting
strategic interaction between countries. Svensson (1984), Marion and Svensson (1984),
Elbers and Withagen (1984) and van Wijnbergen (1985) study the welfare effects of
oil price increases, of tariffs and subsidies on oil imports and of capital income taxes
in models of international trade in the absence of any pollution externalities. Aarrestad
(1978) and Farzin (1999) examine the joint determination of optimal savings and resource
extraction in a model with an exogenous interest rate and no factor mobility. The rare
general equilibrium treatments in this literature include Chiarella (1980), Elbers and
Withagen (1984), Hillman and Long (1985) and Golosov et al. (2014). Recently, a new
strand has emerged – the literature on the so-called “Green Paradox”, a term coined
by Sinn (2008), with the idea originating in Sinclair (1992, 1994). It studies the effects
of taxes on the equilibrium extraction path of a non-renewable resource. Particularly,
the weak version of the Green Paradox states that a greening of future tax policies
will induce resource owners to speed up extraction in the present. This paper is most
closely related to van der Meijden et al. (2015) who find that the Green Paradox may
be mitigated, attenuated or even reversed in general equilibrium, with the most realistic
outcome being a weakening of this unintended effect. In this paper, I confirm that Green
Paradox effects occur under reasonable assumptions. In addition, I go one step beyond
the analysis in van der Meijden et al. (2015) by deriving the Nash equilibrium tax rates
on resources and capital under commitment. Further related papers are Eichner and
Pethig (2011, 2013) who analyze unilaterally imposed emissions caps in models with two
periods and two or three countries but neither include capital as a production input
nor an endogenous extraction decision by resource firms. Burniaux and Oliveira Martins
(2012) develop a two-region, two-goods general equilibrium framework with international
trade and capital mobility to explore carbon leakage of unilaterally imposed policies.
Recently, two papers have addressed these two literatures, as well. Franks et al. (forth-
coming) model the strategic interactions between two symmetric resource-importing
countries and show that competition over carbon taxes Pareto-dominates competition
over capital taxes for these countries because it is able to capture part of the resource
owners’ scarcity rent. Tax competition in that model is motivated purely by fiscal, not
environmental concerns like in my model. Ogawa et al. (2016) show in a static model
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that while increased capital mobility increases global production efficiency, the gains
from capital market integration and capital tax competition accrue only to resource-
poor countries.
The papers mentioned above miss out at least one of the following features which are all
relevant in the context of climate policy and addressed in the present paper: (1) Non-
renewable resources are in finite supply. (2) Their use causes environmental externalities.
(3) The economy is not a single unit, and decentralized policy-making implies strategic
interactions. (4) Capital and resources are mobile. (5) The interaction of different factor
markets requires treatment in a general equilibrium framework.
3 The model
I consider an economy consisting of n ≥ 2 symmetric jurisdictions which can be thought
of as sovereign countries. The time horizon of the model comprises two periods. For
simplicity, I shall sometimes refer to period one as ‘the present’ or ‘today’ and period
two as ‘the future’ or ‘tomorrow’. Governments are the strategic agents in this model and
play a Nash game over tax rates, taking the decisions and reactions of all (non-strategic)
followers, i.e., households and firms, into account.
The model builds up on Eichner and Runkel (2012) but differs in two important respects.
First, I model production not only in one period. This allows me to capture the effect
of current climate policies on savings and thus future consumption. Second, I relax the
assumption that emissions are tied one-to-one to capital investment by introducing non-
renewable resources (such as oil, coal and gas) as an additional and explicit production
factor which can be substituted for capital to some degree. Resources are fully exhausted
by the end of the time horizon, and their use in production gives rise to transboundary
emissions.
3.1 Production firms
In each country i and each period t = 1, 2, a representative firm produces an output
good which is taken as the numéraire. Firms in all countries have access to the same
production technology F (kit, rit) where kit denotes capital input and rit non-renewable
resource (or energy) input in period t. Production is increasing in both inputs with
decreasing marginal returns (Fkk < 0 < Fk, Frr < 0 < Fr). The cross-partial derivative
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is assumed to be positive, Fkr > 0 (though I will sometimes contrast my results with
Fkr = 0 to provide intuition). The higher Fkr, the more complementary (or ‘cooperative’
in the terminology of Svensson, 1984) are capital and resources in production. I further
assume that production exhibits decreasing returns to scale with respect to capital and
resources, which implies strictly positive profits.2
Installed production capacity results from previous capital investment and is thus fixed
in the short run. In other words, the stock of capital k¯ employed in each country in the
first period is exogenously given and immobile. The production function in this period
can then simply be written as F (k¯, ri1) ≡ f(ri1). Second-period capital is rented on a
global capital market at the uniform rate ρ while resources are purchased on a global
resource market at price pt in period t.3
Given that country i levies a unit source-based tax κi on capital4 and a period-specific
(resource or environmental) tax τ it on resource use, after-tax profits of the representative
firm in country i are given by:
pii1 = f(ri1)− (p1 + τ i1)ri1 , (1)
pii2 = F (ki, ri2)− (ρ+ κi)ki − (p2 + τ i2)ri2 . (2)
Profit maximization implies that after-tax returns to both factors are equalized across
countries in all periods:
fr(ri1)− τ i1 = p1 , (3)
Fr(ki, ri2)− τ i2 = p2 , (4)
Fk(ki, ri2)− κi = ρ . (5)
3.2 Resource extraction firms
In each country, there exists a limited, identical and homogenous stock of non-renewable
resources, say coal, oil and gas, which can be extracted at zero cost. The resource stock
2 An alternative interpretation is that the production function is linearly homogenous in capital, re-
sources and a fixed factor such as labor and land like, for example, in Hassler and Krusell (2012).
With a fixed factor, deducting capital and resource costs from profits yields the rent accruing to that
factor.
3 Transport costs of resource trade are assumed to be zero.
4 The capital tax in this model is equivalent to a tax on investment, irrespective of whether investment
stems from domestic or foreign sources. In the symmetric equilibrium that I focus on, the capital tax
is also equivalent to a tax on savings.
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located in country i, Qi, is managed and fully exploited by a representative resource
extraction firm which supplies to a competitive world market qi1 units of the resource in
the present and the remainder, qi2 = Qi− qi1, in the future.5 Profits of this firm in period
t are given by:6
Πit = ptqit . (6)
Maximizing the present value of profits subject to the resource constraint and taking
world market prices as given, implies that the price of the resource rises with the interest
rate:
p2 = p1(1 + ρ) . (7)
This equation is the well-known Hotelling’s rule, which keeps resource extraction firms
in all countries indifferent between extracting today and tomorrow (Hotelling, 1931).
Thus, on this competitive resource market, resource demand alone pins down the equi-
librium quantities supplied as long as equation (7) holds.7 How much of the aggregate
resource stock Q = ∑nl=1Ql is extracted in the first period depends on the point of
intersection of the aggregate first-period inverse (resource) demand schedule and the
aggregate second-period inverse demand schedule, the latter discounted by 1 + ρ. Im-
portantly, this implies that the equilibrium quantity supplied by each of the n resource
firms in period one is, in principle, indeterminate. Only in aggregate must supply meet
demand, ∑nl=1 ql1 = ∑nl=1 rl1, and there is a continuum of supplied quantities that satisfy
this equality.
3.3 Households
Each country is populated by a representative household which owns both the pro-
duction and the resource extraction firm in its country of origin and thus receives the
corresponding profits piit and Πit. Any positive revenues from taxing production inputs
5 None of the results would change if I assumed that the resource owner herself (the representative
household to be described next) manages the resource stock.
6 The focus of this paper is on demand-side policies which is why I neglect any taxes on resource
extraction, so-called “severance taxes”. Although some U.S. states rely very heavily on severance taxes,
most environmental taxes are energy- or transport-related (EEA, 2000). Furthermore, demand-side
policies seem to rank higher on the political agenda than supply-side policies.
7 As shown by Stiglitz (1976), monopoly pricing yields the same result as competitive markets if resource
demand elasticities are the same across periods.
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are returned lump-sum to consumers in each period:
ψi1 = τ i1ri1 , (8)
ψi2 = τ i2ri2 + κiki , (9)
where ψit is the sign-unconstrained lump-sum transfer in period t.
First- and second-period consumption, ci1 and ci2, then read:
ci1 = pii1 + Πi1 + ψi1 − si , (10)
ci2 = pii2 + Πi2 + ψi2 + (1 + ρ)si , (11)
where si is savings.
The household receives utility from first- and second-period consumption, but is harmed
by pollution from global resource use r1 =
∑n
l=1 r
l
1 in the first period, D(r1). One can
think of greenhouse gas emissions from burning fossil fuels in production.8 Welfare of
the representative household in country i reads:
W i = U(ci1)−D(r1) + ci2 , (12)
where  ≤ 1 is the discount factor.9 U is assumed to be concave and twice differentiable
while pollution damages are assumed to be weakly convex (U ′′ < 0 < U ′, D′ > 0, D′′ ≥
0). The quasi-linear specification of the utility function rules out income effects on first-
period consumption. This can be justified by empirical evidence that the substitution
effect of a marginal change in the interest rate outweighs the income effect (see, for
example, Boskin, 1978, or Gylfason, 1993).
Households choose savings si to maximize utility (12) subject to budget constraints
(10) and (11), taking firm profits, lump-sum transfers and damages as given. From the
necessary and sufficient condition for a household maximum (Euler equation),
U ′(ci1)− (1 + ρ) = 0 , (13)
8 I neglect damages in the second period for two reasons. First, the focus of this paper is on how the
equilibrium extraction path is influenced by environmental and fiscal policy. Therefore, I am interested
in the speed of extraction, which is equivalent to first-period extraction. Second, the natural decay
and removal rate of greenhouse gases from the atmosphere is relatively small, and if resources are fully
extracted like in this model, the damage in the second period is simply a function of Q and thus a
constant.
9 In contrast to Eichner and Runkel (2012), I do not assume that a physical public good is provided.
This would only change the levels of the lump-sum transfer but not any of the tax rates of interest.
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we obtain for marginal increases in the interest rate ρ and first-period income pii1, Πi1 or
ψi1:
∂si
∂ρ
= − 
U ′′(ci1)
> 0 , (14)
∂si
∂pii1
= ∂s
i
∂Πi1
= ∂s
i
∂ψi1
= 1 . (15)
Equation (14) implies a positive capital supply elasticity (∂si/∂ρ)ρ/si > 0, and (15)
states that, starting from a household optimum, any increase in profits or the lump-sum
transfer in the first period increases only second-period consumption via the associated
one-to-one increase in savings.
3.4 Global capital market
First-period capital is assumed to be fixed and immobile but second-period capital is per-
fectly mobile between countries and traded on a global capital market. The equilibrium
interest rate ρ on this market is found by equating capital demand by production firms
as described by equation (5) and capital supply by households as implicitly characterized
by equation (13):
n∑
l=1
kl =
n∑
l=1
sl . (16)
In particular, this equation determines ρ as a function of the resource prices p1 and p2
and all tax rates τ i1, τ i2 and κi in all countries.
3.5 Global resource market
In contrast to the capital market, the resource market needs not only to equate demand
and supply across countries but also across periods. One necessary condition for resource
markets to clear is Hotelling’s rule, equation (7). The other necessary conditions are:
n∑
l=1
rl1 =
n∑
l=1
ql1 , (17)
n∑
l=1
rl2 =
n∑
l=1
ql2 . (18)
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The resource demand functions on the left-hand side are implicitly given by equations
(3) and (4), whereas the supply functions on the right-hand-side are indeterminate as
long as Hotelling’s rule holds. Hotelling’s rule and equations (17)–(18) jointly determine
the equilibrium world market prices p1 and p2 as functions of the interest rate ρ and the
tax rates τ i1, τ i2 and κi in all countries.
Note that the equilibrium levels of capital and resources used in production are deter-
mined by the first-order conditions of profit maximization, (3)–(5), Hotelling’s rule (7),
equation (13) and the prices implied by the market-clearing conditions (16)–(18), and
can thus be expressed as functions of the tax rates τ i1, τ i2 and κi in all countries.
4 Comparative statics of unilateral tax policies
Having characterized all demand and supply schedules as well as all market equilibria,
we can now calculate the comparative statics of unilateral marginal tax increases. To
this end, we totally differentiate equations (3)–(5) for all i = 1, . . . , n and (7), and insert
them into the differentiated conditions (16)–(18), using (14) and (15). The comparative
statics with respect to second-period tax rates can be regarded as announcement effects.
Starting from a symmetric equilibrium where ki = si = s and qit = rit for all t = 1, 2
holds, we arrive at the following results (derived in the Appendix) – first for resource
taxes, then for the capital tax.10
4.1 Resource taxes
For unilateral marginal increases in the resource taxes τ i1 (left-hand side of the following
equations) and τ i2 (right-hand side), it holds:
∂ρ
∂τ i1
= −(1 + ρ)(Fkr − frFkk)
n∆ > 0 ,
∂ρ
∂τ i2
= Fkr − frFkk
n∆ < 0 , (19a)
∂p1
∂τ i1
= p1Fkr − Φ−Θ
n∆ < 0 ,
∂p1
∂τ i2
= frrΩ
n∆ < 0 , (19b)
10 As mentioned in Section 3.2, asymmetric extraction across countries is possible and would imply
asymmetric resource incomes across countries in the first period. However, I focus on symmetric
equilibria where players use the same strategy, i.e., the same tax rates. Identical tax rates, however,
can only be a best response if extraction occurs symmetrically such that qit = rit and si = ki. Symmetric
extraction paths could also be obtained by introducing convex (flow- or stock-dependent) extraction
costs that are identical in all countries. Then, the wells with the least cost would be depleted first and
equally fast.
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∂p2
∂τ i1
= −(1 + ρ)(Φ− frFkr)
n∆ < 0 ,
∂p2
∂τ i2
= Φ− frFkr −∆
n∆ < 0 , (19c)
where Γ = FkkFrr − (Fkr)2 > 0, Φ = Frr − ∂s/∂ρΓ < 0, Ω = ∂s/∂ρFkk − 1 < 0,
Θ = fr(p1Fkk − Fkr) < 0 and ∆ = Φ− p1Fkr − (1 + ρ)frrΩ + Θ < 0.11
Marginal increases in any of the two tax rates lower the world market prices for resources
in both periods and also impact on the interest rate. Even under a purely substitutive
production technology, Fkr = 0, the interest rate would be affected since a change in
resource use in the first period and the associated change in production go along with a
change in savings and thus alter the capital stock in the second period. A second effect
on ρ via the capital demand-side arises from the assumed complementarity and goes in
the same direction as the capital supply effect: the change in second-period resource use
induced by the tax increase changes capital demand through its impact on the marginal
product of capital.
For resource use in the tax-increasing country i and all other countries j 6= i and for
pollution, we obtain:
∂ri1
∂τ i1
= (n− 1)∆− (1 + ρ)frrΩ
nfrr∆
< 0 , ∂r
i
1
∂τ i2
= Ω
n∆ > 0 , (20a)
∂rj1
∂τ i1
= p1Fkr − Φ−Θ
nfrr∆
> 0 , ∂r
j
1
∂τ i2
= Ω
n∆ > 0 , (20b)
∂r1
∂τ i1
= −(1 + ρ)Ω∆ < 0 ,
∂r1
∂τ i2
= Ω∆ > 0 , (20c)
∂ri2
∂τ i1
= (1 + ρ)Ω
n∆ > 0 ,
∂ri2
∂τ i2
= (n− 1)Fkk∆− ΓΩ
nΓ∆ < 0 , (20d)
∂rj2
∂τ i1
= (1 + ρ)Ω
n∆ > 0 ,
∂rj2
∂τ i2
= −Fkk∆ + ΓΩ
nΓ∆ > 0 , (20e)
∂r2
∂τ i1
= (1 + ρ)Ω∆ > 0 ,
∂r2
∂τ i2
= −Ω∆ < 0 , (20f)
where rt =
∑n
l=1 r
l
t = rit + (n − 1)rjt denotes the total amount of resources used in
production in period t.
Unilateral increases in period-t resource taxes have unambiguous and intuitive effects
on resource use, as also predicted by partial equilibrium models. A marginal increase in
the period-t tax in country i lowers resource use in this country and increases resource
11 With decreasing returns to scale in production as assumed, Γ is greater than zero. Constant returns
to scale would imply Γ = 0.
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use in all other countries in period t via a decline in pt. We thus have intratemporal
leakage between countries, which is imperfect in the sense that unilateral efforts to
reduce resource use are not completely offset by reactions of market participants in
other countries. As in partial equilibrium (where ρ is fixed), a fall in pt goes along
with a fall in the resource price in the other period to facilitate higher resource use in
that period and achieve an equilibrium on the resource market. This intertemporal
leakage effect hits all countries alike. Changes in pollution from aggregate resource use
r1 exhibit the same sign as the effects on first-period resource use in the tax-increasing
country. Furthermore, a marginal increase in the second-period tax leads to the effect
generally known as the Green Paradox (Sinclair, 1992; Sinn, 2008), i.e., an expansion
of current resource extraction. This result is in line with van der Meijden et al. (2015)
who find that in general equilibrium an attenuation of the Green Paradox (compared
to a partial equilibrium treatment) is the most likely outcome if the second-period tax
rate is increased and investment in physical capital is possible. In fact, unless the income
effect outweighs the substitution effect (which is unlikely as argued above), a reversal
of the Green Paradox, i.e., a reduction of current extraction induced by an increase in
future resource taxes, cannot happen in their model.
Denoting the total stock of capital in the second period by k = ∑nl=1 kl = ki+ (n−1)kj ,
we further derive:
∂ki
∂τ i1
=
(1 + ρ)
[
fr − ∂s∂ρFkr
]
n∆ R 0 ,
∂ki
∂τ i2
=
Fkr
[
∂s
∂ρΓ− (n− 1)∆
]
− frΓ
nΓ∆ R 0 ,
(21a)
∂kj
∂τ i1
=
(1 + ρ)
[
fr − ∂s∂ρFkr
]
n∆ R 0 ,
∂kj
∂τ i2
=
Fkr
[
∂s
∂ρΓ + ∆
]
− frΓ
nΓ∆ > 0 , (21b)
∂k
∂τ i1
=
(1 + ρ)
[
fr − ∂s∂ρFkr
]
∆ R 0 ,
∂k
∂τ i2
=
∂s
∂ρFkr − fr
∆ R 0 . (21c)
For a purely substitutive relationship between capital and resources in production,
Fkr = 0, the change in capital use would solely be driven by the change in savings
due to the intertemporal reallocation of resource use. We have seen that a marginal
change in τ it lowers domestic and aggregate resource use in period t but increases re-
source use in the other period. If, e.g., it increased first-period resource use, more output
would be produced and the associated increase in profits would translate one-to-one into
higher savings and thus higher capital investment in the second period. With comple-
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mentarity, capital use is also affected by the change in resource use following marginal
tax changes. To stick with our example, declining second-period resource use would go
along with decreasing capital demand (at home and in aggregate) and an interest rate
that is decreasing by more than under perfect substitutability, implying lower savings.
This effect thus counteracts the first (direct) effect implying increased savings, and it is
unclear which effect is stronger. Only for a marginal increase in τ i2 does investment in
all countries j 6= i unambiguously rise.
4.2 Capital tax
A marginal increase in the capital tax κi has the following effects on world market prices:
∂ρ
∂κi
= −(1 + ρ)frr + Frr − frFkr
n∆ < 0 , (22a)
∂p1
∂κi
=
frr
[
p1 − ∂s∂ρFkr
]
n∆ R 0 , (22b)
∂p2
∂κi
= −p1(Frr − frFkr) + (1 + ρ)frr
∂s
∂ρFkr
n∆ < 0 . (22c)
As intuition suggests, a marginal increase in κi depresses the interest rate. The second-
period price for the resource falls while the effect on the first-period resource price is
ambiguous in sign, depending on the term p1 − ∂s/∂ρFkr.
Concerning changes in investment in the tax-increasing country i and all other countries
j 6= i, we find:
∂ki
∂κi
=
(n− 1)Frr∆− ∂s∂ρΓ[(1 + ρ)frr + Frr] + p1frΓ
nΓ∆ < 0 , (23a)
∂kj
∂κi
=
Fkr[p1Frr + (1 + ρ)frr ∂s∂ρFkr]− Frr[(1 + ρ)frr + Frr] + p1frΓ
nΓ∆ > 0 , (23b)
∂k
∂κi
=
p1fr − ∂s∂ρ [(1 + ρ)frr + Frr]
∆ < 0 . (23c)
A marginal increase in κi lowers investment in the tax-increasing country but increases
investment in all other countries due to the declining interest rate and the declining
resource price p2. Aggregate investment falls.
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Furthermore, we have:
∂ri1
∂κi
=
p1 − ∂s∂ρFkr
n∆ R 0 , (24a)
∂rj1
∂κi
=
p1 − ∂s∂ρFkr
n∆ R 0 , (24b)
∂r1
∂κi
=
p1 − ∂s∂ρFkr
∆ R 0 , (24c)
∂ri2
∂κi
= −
(n− 1)Fkr∆ + Γ
[
p1 − ∂s∂ρFkr
]
nΓ∆ R 0 , (24d)
∂rj2
∂κi
=
Fkr∆− Γ
[
p1 − ∂s∂ρFkr
]
nΓ∆ > 0 , (24e)
∂r2
∂κi
= −p1 −
∂s
∂ρFkr
∆ R 0 . (24f)
The signs of most of the equations above depend on the sign of the term p1− ∂s/∂ρFkr.
Assume for the moment a purely substitutive technology, i.e., Fkr = 0. Then, all effects
have a unique sign: as capital becomes more expensive for the production firm in country
i due to the marginal tax increase, it will substitute away from capital into more resource
use. The accompanying fall in the second-period resource price and the decrease in the
interest rate stimulate resource use in all other countries in that period. A symmetric
decline in first-period resource use (and pollution) results, going along with an increase
in p1. A unilateral increase in capital taxes thus slows down resource extraction whenever
capital and resources are perfect substitutes.
For Fkr > 0, the sign of p1−∂s/∂ρFkr is determined by the complex interplay in general
equilibrium and difficult to qualify analytically since the degree of complementarity
between capital and resources as measured by Fkr also plays a role in pinning down p1.
A sufficiently high degree of complementarity, i.e., a sufficiently high value of Fkr, causes
the whole term to be negative, leading to lower second-period resource use in the tax-
increasing country. The intuition is that a unilateral increase in the capital tax also puts
a burden on the resource input whenever complementarity is sufficiently high. Although
resource demand in all other countries is spurred by a decline in p2 and ρ, the direct
effect outweighs the indirect effects in all other countries such that global resource use
in the future falls. A unilateral increase of the capital tax then speeds up global resource
extraction and increases pollution, accompanied by a decrease in p1.
Similar effects can be observed for a sufficiently high capital supply elasticity as measured
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by ∂s/∂ρ (and for Fkr strictly positive). A higher ∂s/∂ρ implies that savings respond
more sharply to the decrease in ρ associated with the increase in κi. With less capital
supply and investment in the second period, also aggregate resource use in the second
period decreases, and aggregate first-period resource use goes up.
Summing up the comparative statics results, we can establish the following proposition.
Proposition 1 (Effects of unilateral tax policies)
Unilateral marginal increases in
• future capital taxes may speed up or slow down first-period extraction, depending
on the degree of complementarity between capital and resources in production and
the size of the capital supply elasticity;
• period-t resource taxes shift resource use towards other countries but depress ag-
gregate resource use in period t (less than 100% intratemporal leakage) and thus
increase global resource use in the other period. This implies Green Paradox effects.
5 Pareto-optimal policies and strategic interactions
In this section, I first derive the benchmark case of Pareto-optimal policies and then
assess the efficiency properties of the Nash equilibrium under different scenarios.
5.1 Pareto-optimal policies
Pareto-optimal policies are found by maximizing lifetime utility W i, equation (12), s.t.
W j = W j , ∀j 6= i, by choosing κi, τ i1 and τ i2. Further constraints are the budget con-
straints of each household, given by (10) and (11), where firm profits and lump-sum
transfers (both of which are exogenous from the perspective of households) are replaced
by (1) and (2) respectively (8) and (9). Furthermore, the conditions of utility maximiza-
tion, (13)–(15), profit maximization, (3)–(7), and the market reactions as described by
(19a)–(24f) need to be considered. Focusing on the symmetric solution with si = ki = s
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and qit = rit, the first-order conditions for the tax rates in country i read:12
(1 + ρ)τ i1
∂r1
∂τ i1
+ τ i2
∂r2
∂τ i1
+ κi ∂k
∂τ i1
− nD
′(r1)

∂r1
∂τ i1
= 0 , (25)
(1 + ρ)τ i1
∂r1
∂τ i2
+ τ i2
∂r2
∂τ i2
+ κi ∂k
∂τ i2
− nD
′(r1)

∂r1
∂τ i2
= 0 , (26)
(1 + ρ)τ i1
∂r1
∂κi
+ τ i2
∂r2
∂κi
+ κi ∂k
∂κi
− nD
′(r1)

∂r1
∂κi
= 0 . (27)
Rearranging these conditions and denoting κi = κ∗, τ i1 = τ∗1 and τ i2 = τ∗2 yields the
following Pareto-optimal tax rates:
κ∗ = 0 , (28)
τ∗1 −
τ∗2
1 + ρ =
nD′(r1)
U ′(ci1)
= nD
′(r1)
(1 + ρ) . (29)
The Pareto-optimal capital tax rate κ∗ equals zero. The social marginal environmental
damage, nD′(r1), from aggregate resource use in the first period, expressed in units
of the first-period consumption good, is fully internalized through the use of resource
taxes. There is one degree of freedom in setting Pareto-optimal resource taxes τ∗1 and τ∗2 .
Either one of the two tax rates is set to zero and a positive first-period/negative second-
period resource tax is implemented, or a convex combination of both instruments that
satisfies equation (29) is used. In any case, the tax profile is falling over time, with a
weakly positive tax in the first and a weakly negative tax in the second period.13 The
intuition is that it is not the static value of the tax rate in one period that matters for
the internalization of the external effect but rather its development over time. Only a
falling tax schedule incentivizes firms to postpone extraction relative to a laissez-faire
scenario without taxes.
12 The resource quantities supplied by each country are, in principle, indeterminate as argued in Section
3.2 and footnote 10 (only in symmetric equilibrium, we have qit = rit and thus si = ki for all i). This
also implies that the derivatives of the supplied quantities with respect to the tax rates  = κi, τ i1, τ i2
are zero for any time period t: ∂qit/∂ = 0. With symmetric extraction costs, we would have: ∂qit/∂ =
(1/n)∂rt/∂, implying that any tax-induced change in aggregate resource demand is met by equal
changes in supply by all resource firms. Both approaches lead to the same first-order conditions in the
Pareto-optimum as well as in the decentralized equilibria inspected below.
13 Pareto-optimal resource tax rates that decline over time have also been found by, e.g., Sinclair (1992,
1994) and Golosov et al. (2014).
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5.2 Dezentralized equilibrium
I now proceed to characterize the equilibrium of the Nash game, assuming that govern-
ments can fully commit to the vector of tax rates, which implies that they do not deviate
from their announced policies in the second period. Obviously, this is not an innocuous
assumption and will be addressed in the Discussion section.
In each country, the benevolent government non-cooperatively maximizes its resident’s
lifetime utility by choosing κi, τ i1 and τ i2, taking the policies of all other countries as
given. In doing so, it takes the household’s budget constraint into account, equations
(10) and (11), and replaces in these equations firm profits by (1) and (2) and lump-sum
transfers by (8) and (9). It also considers the conditions of utility maximization, (13)–
(15), profit maximization, (3)–(7), and the market reactions (19a)–(19c), (20a), (20d),
(21a), (22a)–(22c), (23a), (24a) and (24d). Assuming that a symmetric equilibrium with
an interior solution exists, it is described by the following first-order conditions:
(1 + ρ)τ i1
∂ri1
∂τ i1
+ τ i2
∂ri2
∂τ i1
+ κi ∂k
i
∂τ i1
− D
′(r1)

∂r1
∂τ i1
= 0 , (30)
(1 + ρ)τ i1
∂ri1
∂τ i2
+ τ i2
∂ri2
∂τ i2
+ κi ∂k
i
∂τ i2
− D
′(r1)

∂r1
∂τ i2
= 0 , (31)
(1 + ρ)τ i1
∂ri1
∂κi
+ τ i2
∂ri2
∂κi
+ κi ∂k
i
∂κi
− D
′(r1)

∂r1
∂κi
= 0 . (32)
Each government trades off the marginal benefits with the marginal costs of tax changes.
These changes affect tax revenues by altering the domestic tax bases in both periods (first
three terms in the above equations), and environmental damage by altering aggregate
resource use in the first period (last term above). Compared to equations (25)–(27), we
observe that governments do not take into account aggregate pollution damages and the
effects of their policies on aggregate variables.
To gain an understanding of the governments’ strategic behavior, I will first discuss the
Nash equilibrium with resource taxes only, then the equilibrium with a capital tax only,
and finally describe the equilibrium with all instruments available.
5.2.1 Nash equilibrium with resource taxes only
Because of their partial equilibrium nature, most models in the literature allow govern-
ments to only have resource taxes at their disposal. In this case, equation (32) drops
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out, and the optimal tax rates in the symmetric Nash equilibrium in country i can be
obtained by rearranging conditions (30) and (31) for κi = 0:
τ i1 = −
nD′(r1)

frrFkkΩ
(n− 1)Fkk∆− Ω [Γ + (1 + ρ)frrFkk] > 0 , (33)
τ i2 =
nD′(r1)

ΓΩ
(n− 1)Fkk∆− Ω [Γ + (1 + ρ)frrFkk] < 0 . (34)
The marginal benefits of a marginal increase in τ i1 or decrease in τ i2 are that they lower
domestic and aggregate resource use in the first period, thereby reducing environmental
damage and increasing resource tax revenue in the second period, see equations (30)–
(31). The associated marginal cost is the loss of resource tax revenue in the first period.
While the resource taxes’ time profile in the Nash equilibrium is falling like in the efficient
solution, the degree of freedom in setting this tax-subsidy combination vanishes. Now
a strictly positive tax in the first and a strictly negative tax rate in the second period
prevail.
To assess the efficiency properties of the Nash equilibrium, we cannot simply compare
the Pareto-optimal tax-subsidy combination with the tax-subsidy combination in the
Nash equilibrium because world market prices and the derivatives contained in the tax
rate equations are endogenous. Instead, we examine the policy externalities, i.e., the
effects of marginal tax increases in country i on welfare in country j 6= i, starting from
the symmetric Nash equilibrium. For  = τ1, τ2, we obtain the following externalities:
∂W j
∂i = −D
′(r1)
∂r1
∂i + (1 + ρ)τ
j
1
∂rj1
∂i + τ
j
2
∂rj2
∂i . (35)
Inserting the Nash equilibrium tax rates and the comparative statics results into (35), it
can be shown that a marginal increase in τ i1 (or a marginal decrease in τ i2) exerts a positive
environmental externality on country j (first term in above equation). Additionally, two
private income externalities (second and third term) arise that change the tax bases in
country j due to resource mobility.14 They have different signs but are strictly positive
in aggregate.
Furthermore, we can establish the following lemma.
14 As tax revenues are recycled lump-sum to consumers, I refer to these externalities as ‘private income’
externalities as in Eichner and Runkel (2012). Introducing a physical public good into this model
would not change any of the results derived here except that the ‘private income‘ externalities could
then be called ‘fiscal’.
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Lemma 1 (Policy externalities of τ i1 and τ i2)
A marginal increase in τ i1 has the opposite effect in present value terms of a marginal
increase in τ i2:
∂W j
∂τ i2
= − 11 + ρ
∂W j
∂τ i1
= − nD
′(r1)FkkΩ
(n− 1)Fkk∆− Ω[Γ + (1 + ρ)frrFkk] < 0 . (36)
Both policy externalities are thus related to the environmental damage in country j.
With only one instrument, a positive (negative) externality would imply that the tax rate
in the Nash equilibrium is set inefficiently low (high). However, we have two instruments
and therefore need to make use of the following lemma (the proof of which can be found
in the Appendix) to be able to say something about whether the Nash equilibrium
tax-subsidy combination τ i1 − τ i2/(1 + ρ) is inefficiently high or low.
Lemma 2 (Aggregate resource use and pollution)
For given tax policies in all other countries, aggregate resource use and pollution are
determined by the difference τ i1 − τ i2/(1 + ρ).
A marginal increase in the tax-subsidy combination τ i1−τ i2/(1+ρ) which can be brought
about by either increasing τ i1 or decreasing τ i2 (or both) thus exerts a positive externality
on all other countries j 6= i such that we can state the following proposition.
Proposition 2 (Inefficiently high pollution in (τ i1, τ i2)-Nash equilibrium)
The tax-subsidy combination in the Nash equilibrium with environmental taxes only is
set inefficiently low and thus aggregate first-period resource use in the first period (equal
to pollution) is inefficiently high.
Like in Eichner and Runkel (2012) for the case of perfect pollution spillovers (β = 1 in
their model), environmental and private income externalities go in the same direction
and imply inefficiently low equilibrium tax rates and thus inefficiently high resource use
in the first period.15
15 This is indeed the standard result in the environmental tax competition literature. Only Oates and
Schwab (1988) and Ogawa and Wildasin (2009) find efficiency of decentralized policy-making, while
a race to the top in environmental regulation has been shown when pollution affects the marginal
productivity of capital (Rauscher, 1997) or when households anticipate government policies (Withagen
and Halsema, 2013).
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5.2.2 Nash equilibrium with capital tax only
In the unlikely case that governments are restricted – for whatever reason – to using
capital taxes, conditions (30) and (31) drop out. For τ i1 = τ i2 = 0, the first-order condition
(32) for country i in the symmetric Nash equilibrium can be written as:
κi = nD
′(r1)

[
p1 − ∂s∂ρFkr
]
Γ
(n− 1)Frr∆− ∂s∂ρΓ [(1 + ρ)frr + Frr] + p1frΓ
. (37)
Specifically, a marginal capital tax increase reduces tax revenue due to the associated
capital outflow but may increase or decrease aggregate first-period resource use and thus
pollution. The sign of the capital tax is thus ambiguous and solely depends on the term
p1 − ∂s/∂ρFkr in the numerator:
κi R 0⇔ p1 − ∂s
∂ρ
Fkr R 0 . (38)
It is – like nearly all ambiguous comparative statics results in Section 4.2 – driven by
the complex interplay of p1, ∂s/∂ρ and Fkr. In particular, the capital tax is negative
whenever the degree of complementarity between capital and resources is sufficiently
high. In this case, a negative capital tax implicitly subsidizes second-period resource use,
which is desired in order to lower resource use and thus pollution in the first period. The
more substitutive the production technology is, the more likely is it that governments
discourage first-period resource use by taxing capital use in the second period. Since
the externality-generating input cannot directly be targeted by the government in this
scenario, we can suspect (and it will be shown in the numerical illustrations of Section
5.3) that not only inefficiently high first-period extraction will prevail but that extraction
is also higher than in the Nash equilibrium with resource taxes only.16
5.2.3 Nash equilibrium with resource and capital taxes
If each government is equipped with the full set of tax instruments, additional consider-
ations enter the governments’ trade-off between marginal costs and marginal benefits. In
particular, marginal changes in resource taxes now affect capital tax revenue. These ef-
fects are ambiguous in sign since investment in country imay rise or fall due to a marginal
increase in τ i1 or τ i2, see equation (21c). Similarly, a marginal capital tax increase may
16 Calculating the policy externality does not yield much insight here because we would have to contrast
it with a constrained Pareto-optimum in which the capital tax is the only available instrument.
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positively or negatively affect resource tax revenues. The first-order conditions (30)–(32)
can be rearranged to yield:
τ i1 = −
D′(r1)

frr
[
(n− 1)− n ∂s∂ρFkk
]
∂s
∂ρ [Γ + (1 + ρ)frrFkk]− (n− 1)∆
> 0 , (39)
τ i2 =
D′(r1)

(n− 1)(Frr − p1Fkr)− n ∂s∂ρΓ
∂s
∂ρ [Γ + (1 + ρ)frrFkk]− (n− 1)∆
< 0 , (40)
κi = D
′(r1)

(n− 1)(Fkr − p1Fkk)
∂s
∂ρ [Γ + (1 + ρ)frrFkk]− (n− 1)∆
> 0 . (41)
As before, resource taxes decline over time, with a strictly positive tax in the first and
a strictly negative tax in the second period. Interestingly, the capital tax is strictly
positive. This is surprising since most comparative statics results of marginal capital
tax increases are ambiguous in sign, and we have seen that the sign of the equilibrium
capital tax is also ambiguous whenever resource taxes are not available. By looking at
the terms in the numerator of equation (41), we can shed light on the effects at work.
By increasing the capital tax from zero to a positive value, a government is able to
induce the firms in all other n− 1 countries to use more resources in the second and less
resources in the first period, thereby slowing down aggregate resource extraction. This
occurs through a channel which I will refer to as the capital-tax-interest-rate channel.
The latter unfolds its effects through the decrease in the interest rate associated with an
increase in the capital tax (see also equation (22a) for a marginal tax increase): First, the
falling interest rate makes investment in non-tax-increasing countries more attractive and
thus spurs, due to complementarity of capital and resources, resource demand abroad
(first term in the numerator of (41)). Second, there is a Hotelling rule effect (second term
in the numerator) which applies even for a purely substitutive production technology.
That is, the fall in the interest rate is accompanied by a fall in p2 which again induces
production firms abroad to demand more resources in the second period. Because of these
two effects, each government finds it beneficial to employ a strictly positive capital tax
in equilibrium. More intuition on the capital-tax-interest-rate channel will be provided
in the next section.
With three instruments at the governments’ disposal, it is impossible to show analytically
whether aggregate first-period resource extraction is inefficiently high or low in the Nash
equilibrium. Therefore, I have to rely on numerical illustrations. However, there is no
reason which would speak for inefficiently low first-period resource extraction if we allow
for an additional instrument (the capital tax).
22
5.3 Numerical illustration
So far, we have seen that the Nash equilibrium when only resource taxes are available
entails inefficiently high resource extraction in the present, and we have suspected the
same thing also for the other two scenarios. In order to show the impact of environmen-
tal and private income externalities on the efficiency of decentralized policy-making and
quantify the effects at work, some numerical illustrations are provided below. I am par-
ticularly interested in by how much an additional capital tax lowers first-period resource
extraction and which role the elasticity of substitution between capital and resources
plays in this regard.
To have an additional benchmark, I sketch the Nash equilibrium under autarky, i.e., when
factors of production are immobile. In this case, there are n purely national capital and
resource markets. I denote the prices on these markets by ρi, pi1 and pi2 in country i. The
modified comparative statics of unilateral marginal tax increases can easily be derived
by setting n = 1 in equations (19a)–(24f). Note that there is no leakage anymore since
capital and resources are not traded across borders. With these modified comparative
statics results, government maximization yields the following tax rates κi0, τ i01 and τ i02
in the autarky Nash equilibrium in each country:
κi0 = 0 , (42)
τ i01 −
τ i02
1 + ρi =
D′(r1)
(1 + ρi) . (43)
The government internalizes the environmental externality imposed on own utility by
choosing a convex combination of resource taxes. This is in fact the standard textbook
case where environmental spillovers are the only externality imposed on other coun-
tries.17 As the capital and resource allocation in other countries cannot be influenced
via tax policies, environmental taxes target the externality best, and there is no role for
capital taxation in this world of closed economies.
For the numerical simulations, I choose a logarithmic first-period utility function and a
quadratic damage function such that equation (12) now reads:
W i = ln(ci1)−
1
2(r1)
2 + ci2 . (44)
17 To see this analytically, cf. equation (35) where the fiscal externalities are zero under autarky since it
holds for all t = 1, 2 and all j 6= i: ∂rjt/∂τ i1 = ∂rjt/∂τ i2 = 0.
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For production, I use a standard CES function:
F (kit, rit) =
[
(kit)α + (rit)α
] z
α , (45)
where z describes the degree of homogeneity and z < 1 is assumed because of decreasing
returns to scale. The elasticity of substitution σ equals 1/(1−α), i.e., the lower is α, the
more complementary are capital and resources. Note that for Fkr to be positive, z > α
has to hold.18
The following two tables illustrate the results obtained under different scenarios for n = 2
and Qi ≡ 1. The laissez-faire scenario involves no government intervention (all tax rates
equal zero), which obviously is not an equilibrium. NE stands for a Nash equilibrium
either without factor mobility (“w/o mobility”), with only κi, only τ i1 and τ i2, or all
instruments at the governments’ disposal. p(i)1 and ρ(i) denote the equilibrium prices on
the national (with superscript (i)) respectively international (without superscript) factor
markets. The displayed parameter constellations are just exemplary but the derived
results hold qualitatively for all other constellations that I examined such that they are
representative in a pars pro toto sense.19
The ranking of scenarios with respect to first-period resource use remains the same across
all parameter constellations. Laissez-faire and Pareto-optimum describe the two extreme
cases, and the autarky NE always entails lower first-period resource extraction than
all NE with factor mobility since the environmental externality is not aggravated by
factor mobility in this scenario. Furthermore, the NE with three instruments gives rise
to lower first-period resource use than the resource-taxes-only scenario which, in turn,
outperforms the capital-tax-only NE. We can summarize these results in the following
proposition.
Proposition 3 (Inefficiently high resource extraction in all Nash equilibria)
All Nash equilibria involve inefficiently high first-period resource extraction and thus
pollution. Factor mobility unambiguously increases resource extraction.
In this regard, the paper generalizes the results obtained by Eichner and Runkel (2012)
who find an inefficiently low tax rate on capital (and thus emissions) in their framework,
implying inefficiently high pollution. While Eichner and Runkel’s analysis is limited to
the case of perfect complementarity between capital and emissions, this paper explicitly
18 Strict quasi-concavity requires α < 1 (Uzawa, 1962), which holds as I assume decreasing returns to
scale and a positive cross-partial derivative Fkr, i.e., α < z < 1.
19 There might be parameter constellations for which an equilibrium does not exist though.
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α = −5 (σ = 1/6)
ri1 k
i τ i1 τ
i
2 κ
i W i
(p(i)1 ) (ρ(i))
Laissez-faire .89 .11 – – – -1.63(.46) (.49)
Pareto-optimum .47 .09 – -4.17 – -.96(.88) (1.36)
NE w/o mobility .66 .19 – -2.95 – -1.08(.72) (1.08)
NE κi .86 .17 – – -.70 -1.53(.50) (.64)
NE τ i1, τ i2
.72 .19 1.00 -.48 – -1.17
(.17) (.97)
NE κi, τ i1, τ i2
.68 .16 1.24 -.33 .39 -1.11
(.09) (.95 )
α = 0.5 (σ = 2)
Laissez-faire .75 1.91 – – – 2.47(1.18) (.74)
Pareto-optimum .37 1.44 – -3.25 – 3.04(1.57) (.88)
NE w/o mobility .489 1.61 – -2.17 – 2.983(1.40) (.83)
NE κi .74 1.87 – – .15 2.51(1.19) (.68)
NE τ i1, τ i2
.51 1.63 .71 -.73 – 2.96
(1.03) (.83)
NE κi, τ i1, τ i2
.491 1.58 .66 -.77 .18 2.980
(1.06) (.75)
Table 1: Simulation results for z = 0.75, k¯ = 1 and  = 0.9.
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α = 0.3 (σ = 10/7)
ri1 k
i τ i1 τ
i
2 κ
i W i
(p(i)1 ) (ρ(i))
Laissez-faire .632 2.36 – – – 7.670(2.60) (2.42)
Pareto-optimum .52 2.09 – -5.21 – 7.809(2.75) (2.68)
NE w/o mobility .572 2.22 – -2.86 – 7.780(2.68) (2.56)
NE κi .630 2.35 – – -.05 7.676(2.60) (2.41)
NE τ i1, τ i2
.60 2.29 .25 -.51 – 7.732
(2.51) (2.49)
NE κi, τ i1, τ i2
.574 2.21 .175 -1.51 .28 7.777
(2.59) (2.42)
α = 0.7 (σ = 10/3)
Laissez-faire .940 .61 – – – -1.14(1.02) (1.04)
Pareto-optimum .38 .15 – -3.79 – -.13(1.12) (1.66)
NE w/o mobility .55 .28 – -2.73 – -.23(1.08) (1.38)
NE κi .937 .59 – – .07 -1.13(1.02) (1.01)
NE τ i1, τ i2
.73 .43 .32 -1.12 – -.53
(.88) (1.20)
NE κi, τ i1, τ i2
.61 .16 .31 -.84 1.57 -.37
(.91) (.74)
Table 2: Simulation results for z = 0.95, k¯ = 0.1 and  = 0.8.
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takes account of the fact that emissions are not simply a by-product of investment but
caused by the burning of fossil resources in production and can be substituted for capital
to some degree.
Table 1 illustrates that the capital-tax-only policy does, unsurprisingly, not internal-
ize much of the environmental externality, the reason being that it does not target the
externality-generating input directly and thus only serves as an imperfect policy sub-
stitute for environmental taxes. Furthermore, our above intuition is confirmed that a
higher degree of complementarity between capital and resources (α = 0.5) does indeed
make a capital subsidy more likely.
The ranking of scenarios with respect to welfare is – as expected – the inverse of the
ranking with respect to first-period extraction. Interestingly, although we might suspect
that the introduction of a capital tax adds to the distortions already present in the
economy, welfare in the NE with all instruments available is unambiguously higher than
in the resource-taxes-only NE. The reason is that the capital tax makes an additional
instrument available to governments, which is – through the capital-tax-interest-rate
channel – able to improve the resource (and capital) allocation across space and across
time. As a result, countries are better off if they use the capital tax as an additional
instrument:
Proposition 4 ((κi, τ i1, τ i2)-NE Pareto-dominates (τ i1, τ i2)-NE)
The use of a capital tax in addition to resource taxes Pareto-dominates the scenario with
resource taxes only.
Furthermore, the private income externalities due to factor mobility are not necessarily
very large. In particular, a higher degree of complementarity between capital and re-
sources seems to bring about smaller private income externalities such that first-period
resource extraction nearly coincides in the autarky NE, the NE with environmental taxes
only and the NE with all instruments available.
Finally, as can be seen in both tables, the capital tax in the NE with all instruments
is relatively small when the elasticity of substitution is low while for a higher degree of
substitutability, the capital tax is higher and achieves a more significant reduction of
first-period resource use relative to the NE with environmental taxes only. The reason
is that in the latter case, the capital tax significantly lowers the interest rate and thus
spurs second-period resource use through the capital-tax-interest-rate channel described
above. This channel is the stronger, the higher is the elasticity of substitution. The
following proposition summarizes these results.
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Proposition 5 (Elasticity of substitution and decentralized policy-making)
Whenever the elasticity of substitution between capital and resources is low, factor mobil-
ity does not significantly worsen efficiency compared to the autarky Nash equilibrium. A
high elasticity of substitution, by contrast, strengthens the capital-tax-interest-rate chan-
nel and thus makes the introduction of an additional strictly positive capital tax more
attractive in terms of lowering aggregate first-period resource use.
6 Discussion
As a remedy to Green Paradox effects like in this model, Sinn (2008) proposes a so-
called supply-side policy, namely a source-based tax on capital income earned by foreign
resource owners in industrialized countries. He argues that this tax will (in partial equi-
librium) depress the net interest rate on reproducible capital and thus make extraction
less attractive to resource owners.20 This paper, by contrast, suggests that not necessar-
ily a supply-side policy needs to be adopted to bring the interest rate down and thus
decelerate resource extraction. As we have seen, also a demand-side policy, specifically
the source-based taxation of capital investment on the side of production firms is able to
tilt the extraction path in the right direction – even in a world where countries compete
for mobile factors of production. This policy might in fact be more realistic because
policy-makers still seem to pay more attention to demand-side policies. In contrast to
Sinn’s proposal, the capital tax does not replace resource taxes. In fact, as illustrated in
the last section, using a capital tax in addition to resource taxes Pareto-dominates the
solitary use of resource taxes.
A natural question that arises in this two-period model is how a third period would
influence the results. As it seems impossible to answer this question analytically (we
would have to introduce two additional markets, the capital and the resource market
in the third period, which would complicate the analysis enormously), some plausible
reasoning shall be attempted here. With a third period, we would have to model damages
also in the second period in order to give governments an incentive to shift resource
extraction through their tax policies from the second to the third period.21 I conjecture
20 Jaakkola (2012) confirms in a two-country Ramsey growth model that a tax on the resource-exporting
country’s capital income is indeed able to achieve an efficient solution when this country does not
produce goods.
21 Possibly, the natural decay and removal rate of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere would also come
into play.
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that the declining time profile of the resource tax would be preserved, with the third-
period resource tax being lower than the second-period tax. Furthermore, the price path
of the resource would now be p3 = (1+ρ2)p2 = (1+ρ2)(1+ρ3)p1, where ρ2 and ρ3 denote
the second- and third-period interest rates, respectively, and p3 the market price of the
resource in the third period. Imposing a strictly positive capital tax in the second period
like in the two-period model in addition to resource taxes would lower production and
thus income and savings of the representative household in that period. As a result, the
third-period capital stock would be lower, thereby increasing ρ3. It seems plausible that
this is not in the governments’ best interest since it would make second-period resource
extraction more attractive. Therefore, I conjecture that capital would also be taxed at
a strictly positive rate in the third period to bring ρ3 down, and possibly at an even
higher rate than in the second period in order to flatten the price and extraction path
over time. If the indirect effect of increasing ρ3 is larger than the direct effect of bringing
ρ2 down, the second-period capital tax might be negative. However, the direct effect
should outweigh the indirect effect.
I have assumed that the government disposes of a commitment technology in this model
but this assumption is not innocuous. The open-loop Nash equilibrium derived here is
time-inconsistent as governments would want to deviate from their announced policies
once the second period has arrived. In particular, they would like to levy zero taxes
on second-period investment and resource use. The intuition is that the environmental
externality which is the only reason for taxation in the model results from first-period
resource use and thus cannot be addressed anymore in the second period. Such time-
inconsistencies are not only a phenomenon of multi-country models like in this paper.
They also haunt the literature on dynamic capital (income) taxation in closed economies.
As pointed out by Fischer (1980) and Chamley (1986), a benevolent government finds
it optimal to tax capital heavily in the short-run but promise zero capital taxes in the
long-run in order to encourage investment. However, if future governments can revise
these policies, they would optimally deviate from the announced plan and tax capital
income heavily in their current and subsequent periods. The intuition is that taxing
capital income is more distortionary in the long-run than in the short-run.
A straightforward solution to the time-inconsistency problem in this paper is to drop any
second-period policies and introduce another instrument in the first period: a subsidy to
savings. In the symmetric equilibrium I examine a second-period tax on capital and a
subsidy on savings are equivalent since investment in each country equals the country’s
savings and the effects of both instruments on the interest rate are the same: they lower
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it and thus induce substitution out of capital into resources in the second period, which,
in turn, slows down resource extraction in the first period. The aim of the above analysis
is to illustrate that other policies than taxes on resource owners’ capital income are also
able to flatten the extraction path by lowering the interest rate – despite the competition
for mobile capital and resources which would more generally call for subsidies in the
absence of any revenue requirements by the government.
7 Conclusion
This paper has analyzed, in a two-period general equilibrium model, strategic tax-setting
of governments which compete for mobile resources and mobile capital and care about
the speed of resource extraction. I found that unilateral policies are effective in slowing
down resource extraction and that Green Paradox effects arise. Furthermore, factor mo-
bility has been found to aggravate transfrontier pollution problems because governments
influence via their tax policies the tax bases in other countries. These private income
externalities unambiguously go in the same direction as the environmental externality
(at least in aggregate). Moreover, under commitment, governments have been found
to have an incentive to tax capital in the future at a strictly positive rate due to the
capital-tax-interest-rate channel even though no physical public goods are provided.
The capital-tax-interest-rate channel has so far been neglected in the literature on in-
terjurisdictional competition because strategic interactions between governments have
been cast in partial equilibrium frameworks, specifically without a global resource mar-
ket (Oates and Schwab, 1988; Ogawa and Wildasin, 2009; Eichner and Runkel, 2012).
As the symmetric set-up leads to zero net resource and capital flows across borders,
I explore asymmetries with respect to resource or capital endowment in a companion
paper. An asymmetric setting incorporates the incentive for resource-importing countries
to tax away resource exporters’ Hotelling rents.
Appendix
A.1 Derivation of comparative statics
Totally differentiating the first-order conditions (3)–(5) for all i = 1, . . . , n yields:
frrdr
i
1 − dτ i1 = dp1 , (A.1)
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Fkrdk
i + Frrdri2 − dτ i2 = dp2 , (A.2)
Fkkdk
i + Fkrdri2 − dκi = dρ . (A.3)
For notational convenience, all functional dependencies for fr, frr, Fkk, Frr, Fkr and
thus Γ, Φ, Ω, Θ and ∆ have been dropped. Only in the symmetric equilibrium are the
functional values in all countries equal because all arguments have equal size.
Solving (A.1)–(A.3) for dri1, dri2 and dki, we obtain:
dri1 =
1
frr
(dp1 + dτ i1) , (A.4)
dri2 =
Fkk
Γ
[
dp2 + dτ i2 −
Fkr
Fkk
(dρ+ dκi)
]
, (A.5)
dki = FrrΓ
[
dρ+ dκi − Fkr
Frr
(dp2 + dτ i2)
]
. (A.6)
Denoting wi1 ≡ pii1 + Πi1 + ψi1, we have:
dwi1 = p1(dqi1 − dri1) + frdri1 , (A.7)
which is needed for determining the reaction of savings to changes in income induced by
tax changes. Although dqi1 − dri1 is undefined for any country i, in aggregate it holds:
n∑
l=1
(dql1 − drl1) = 0 . (A.8)
Totally differentiating Hotelling’s rule (7) and the capital and resource market equilib-
rium conditions (16)–(18), using (A.7) and (A.8), yields:
dp2 = (1 + ρ)dp1 + p1dρ , (A.9)
n∑
l=1
dkl =
n∑
l=1
∂sl
∂ρ
dρ+
n∑
l=1
∂sl
∂wl1
dwl1 =
n∑
l=1
∂sl
∂ρ
dρ+
n∑
l=1
frdr
l
1 , (A.10)
n∑
l=1
drl1 = −
n∑
l=1
drl2 . (A.11)
Starting from a symmetric equilibrium and inserting (A.4)–(A.6) into (A.10) and (A.11),
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we can write:
nfr
frr
dp1 +
nFkr
Γ dp2 −
n
[
Frr − ∂s∂ρΓ
]
Γ dρ+
n∑
l=1
fr
frr
dτ l1 +
n∑
l=1
Fkr
Γ dτ
l
2 −
n∑
l=1
Frr
Γ dκ
l = 0 ,
(A.12)
n
frr
dp1 +
nFkk
Γ dp2 −
nFkr
Γ dρ+
n∑
l=1
1
frr
dτ l1 +
n∑
l=1
Fkk
Γ dτ
l
2 −
n∑
l=1
Fkr
Γ dκ
l = 0 , (A.13)
Finally, by inserting (A.9) into (A.12) and (A.13), it follows:
(1 + ρ)Fkr
Γ dp1 −
Frr − ∂s∂ρΓ− p1Fkr
Γ dρ−
1
n
[
n∑
l=1
Frr
Γ dκ
l −
n∑
l=1
Fkr
Γ dτ
l
2
]
(A.14)
= 0 ,
Γ + (1 + ρ)frrFkk
FrrΓ
dp1 +
p1Fkk − Fkr
Γ dρ+
1
n
[
n∑
l=1
1
frr
dτ l1 +
n∑
l=1
Fkk
Γ dτ
l
2 −
n∑
l=1
Fkr
Γ dκ
l
]
(A.15)
= 0 .
These two equations jointly determine the market reactions dp1/di and dρ/di to
unilateral marginal increases in  = τ1, τ2, κ in country i, where a unilateral increase
in τ i1, for example, is found by setting dτ i2 = dκi = 0 and dτk1 = dτk2 = dκk = 0 for all
k 6= i. Inserting these results into (A.9) implies dp2/di.
Plugging the market reactions as described by (19a)–(19c) and (22a)–(22c) back into
(A.4)–(A.6) for the tax-increasing country i and country j 6= i, we obtain after some
rearrangements equations (20a)–(21c) and (23a)–(24f).
A.2 Proof of Lemma 2
We know that aggregate resource use in the first period is – for given taxes in all other
countries – a function of τ i1 and τ i2. Totally differentiating r1 = G(τ i1, τ i2) yields:
dr1 =
∂G
∂τ i1
dτ i1 +
∂G
∂τ i2
dτ i2 . (A.16)
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We also know from the comparative statics that
∂r1
∂τ i1

dτ i2=0
= −(1 + ρ)∂r1
∂τ i2

dτ i1=0
. (A.17)
From these two equations follows immediately:
∂G
∂τ i1
= −(1 + ρ)∂G
∂τ i2
⇔ ∂G
∂τ i1
+ (1 + ρ)∂G
∂τ i2
= 0 , (A.18)
which is a partial differential equation.
Let G(τ i1, 0) = G(τ i1) for τ i2 = 0. If G(τ i1) exists and is differentiable, then it follows from
the calculus of partial differential equations:
G(τ i1, τ i2) = G
(
τ i1 −
τ i2
1 + ρ
)
. (A.19)
That is, aggregate first-period resource use and thus pollution only depend on the dif-
ference τ i1 − τ i2/(1 + ρ). 
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